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Background and aims: One’s belief in good luck, and belief that it is a personal trait, could play a crucial role in
gambling behavior, and can lead gamblers to have an irrational anticipation to win and to over-generalize their
subjective sense of control. And upward counterfactual thinking has been considered to be a factor that offsets those
irrational beliefs. This study examined the effects of belief in good luck and of upward counterfactual thinking on
gambling behavior. Methods: The subjects of the study were 52 college students who had been classiﬁed as non-
problematic and non-pathological gamblers. They were assigned into one of two groups, distinguished by having
either high (n = 25) or low (n = 27) levels of self-perception of luck, as determined by their scores on the Belief in
Good Luck (BIGL) Scale. The subjects were assigned to different groups according to their reported experience of
upward counterfactual thinking. Results: We found that those who had high BIGL scores spent more money on
gambling than those who had low BIGL scores. Moreover, after taking into account the upward counterfactual
thinking, the subjects with high BIGL scores showed a dramatic decrease in their expectations of winning.
Discussion: The results indicate that to perceive luck as a personal and internal trait could affect gambling, which
is one of the cognitive errors for gambling addiction. On the other hand, given that upward counterfactual thinking
plays an important role in reducing cognitive errors, it could act as a protective factor against gambling addiction.
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INTRODUCTION
According to the DSM-5, gambling disorder, which is
categorized under the classiﬁcation of substance-related and
addictive disorders, is characterized as a maladaptive be-
havior for which the individual suffers from a preoccupation
with gambling, withdrawal, tolerance, repeated failure of
control, hypersensitive feelings, avoidance, and deception
(APA, 2013). Those maladaptive aspects cause not only a
deﬁciency in impulse control but could also lead to other
problems, such as crime, divorce, unemployment, suicide,
and devastated personalities (National Research Council,
1999).
The prevalence of gambling addiction might vary
according to the speciﬁc study and the measurements used,
but according to a gambling industry statistic (The National
Gambling Control Commission, 2014), the prevalence of
gambling addiction in Korea was 7.2%. When using the
same measurement, the prevalence is much higher than that
of the United Kingdom (2.5%), France (1.3%), and Australia
(2.4%). It is noteworthy to mention that gambling has
rapidly spread among young people and is increasingly
becoming a problem. In the United States, 85% of under-
graduate students have gambled, and 23% of them gambled
weekly (Indiana Prevention Resource Center, 2010). Simi-
larly, in Korea, 70% of pathological gamblers started their
ﬁrst experience with gambling before the age of 20 (Rhee,
Kim & Kim, 2003). The prevalence of gambling addiction
in undergraduate students is 11%, which is twice higher than
that for adults (Kwon & Kim, 2011). This demonstrates
that the risk for gambling in youth has increased as the
“get-rich-quick” fever for a jackpot (Kwon, Kim & Choi,
2006) has become a widespread phenomenon. Therefore, it
is crucial to ﬁnd the risk factors and precautions for
gambling among the young population in Korea.
Problem gambling should be treated as complex con-
sequences of various factors that affect each other (Kim,
2004; Kwon, Kim & Choi, 2006; Yeon, 2006), including
cognitive error, which is a very critical factor in maintaining
gambling behavior. It often allows the prediction of recur-
ring gambling problems. An irrational belief in gambling
that leads to winning could also lead to excessive gambling
behavior (Ledgerwood & Petry, 2006; Wohl, Young &
Hart, 2007). The irrational belief in gambling is a fallacious
cognitive expectation or thought about the process of, as
well as the result of gambling (Lee, 2003). There are several
cognitive errors that have come to light: an illusion of
control, a wrong perception, biased evaluations, and irratio-
nal cognition, etc. (Toneatto, 1999).
An erroneous perception of the randomness of gambling
can lead to the illusion of control, and this illusion of control
is the thought that gambling requires some kind of skill and
that a gambler can predict or determine the result of
gambling as long as he has learned such skills (Langer,
1975). For example, a gambler can make the mistake of
thinking that gambling can be won with skills rather than
with luck or chance (Grifﬁths, 1994; Walker, 1992).
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Many researchers have studied luck, as an irrational
belief where the individual perceives a sense of control
over unpredictable results (Darke & Freedman, 1997b;
Friedland, 1998; Levenson, 1974; Rotter, 1966). Rotter
(1966) believed that with respect to social learning theory,
the differences between the locus of control can explain the
differences between behaviors. Weiner et al. (1972) pro-
posed that perceived control leads to attributing the result of
an event to the individual. These two studies similarly claim
that luck is an external, unstable factor. In other words,
traditional social learning theorists assume that people
would regard an event decided by luck to be out of control.
However, the view in which people believe that luck is
external and unstable has long been questioned (Meyer,
1980; Meyer & Koelbl, 1982). Just like superstitious con-
ventions or athletes’ Jinx, many people indeed act in a way
that shows they believe luck to be an internal, stable factor
(Darke & Freedman, 1997b).
Such belief in good luck contributes to the maintenance
of positive attitudes, including during uncontrollable events
(Rothbaum, Weisz & Snyder, 1982). Besides, belief in good
luck has a positive effect on various aspects, such as on
psychological well-being (Day & Maltby, 2003; Taylor &
Brown, 1988), conﬁdence, sense of control, and optimism
(Darke & Freedman, 1997a). Day and Maltby (2005)
explained that belief in good luck could bring about
goal-oriented behavior.
However, when it comes to pathological gambling, belief
in good luck is deemed to be irrational. A gambler who
thinks that he or she is lucky tends to believe that he would
win as a result of that luck (Wohl & Enzle, 2002), and the
expectation of luck-based wins then leads to gambling
problems (Wohl, Stewart & Young, 2011). In Korea, re-
search on college students (Lee & Hyun, 2012) found that
individuals with high levels of belief in good luck gambled
more often than did those with low levels of belief in good
luck.
The traditional social learning theory says that the be-
havior of an individual can be explained through mechan-
isms of reinforcement and punishment. (For instance, an
individual would gamble more frequently, if he or she
would be reinforced to express such behavior. On the other
hand, he or she would stop if punishment were at hand).
However, gambling behaviors tend to continue even when
negative results (e.g., ﬁnancial losses) are repeated. Thus,
other factors, such as individual characteristics, should also
be considered. This study, therefore, sought to ascertain
individuals’ internal factor of their belief in good luck with
respect to their gambling behavior.
A gambler shows a patterned, biased evaluation of
reasoning about gambling outcomes (Toneatto, 1999). This
biased evaluation indicates the tendency of a gambler to
think that victory is a direct outcome of a successful
prediction or efforts on his or her part. Fallacious cognitive
characteristics of irrational gambling beliefs exist (Lee,
2007), and these consolidate distorted attritional processes
of failures (Gilovich & Douglas, 1986; Ladouceur &
Gaboury, 1988). Likewise, when there is a problem with
a causal reasoning of the results, cognitive errors can occur.
One thought process that brings about causal reasoning is
that of counterfactual thinking. Counterfactual thinking is
the process where an individual thinks about an alternative
virtual event, after experiencing an unpredictable outcome
for an event (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), e.g., “If I had bet
this much money, then I would have won much more.” This
counterfactual thinking has a powerful effect on the experi-
ence of emotions and on behavior in the future (Landman,
1987; Medvec & Savitsky, 1997).
Counterfactual thinking is categorized into either struc-
ture or direction. Depending on the direction of the results,
upward counterfactual thinking and downward counter-
factual thinking can be indicated (Markman, Gavanski,
Sherman & McMullen, 1993; McMullen, Markman &
Gavanski, 1995). Simultaneously during an event, if an
individual thinks about a better alternative event, this is
called upward counterfactual thinking, and if it is a worse
alternative event, then it is downward counterfactual thinking.
There are two factors that affect counterfactual thinking:
mutability and situational aspects (Hur, 2002). In counter-
factual thinking, an event that has occurred can be easily
switched to an alternative event in a person’s mind (Kahne-
man & Miller, 1986). Counterfactual thinking can be in-
duced more easily in situations where personal behaviors
are especially attributed to positive situations than to
negative situations. With positive outcomes, downward
counterfactual thinking is likely to occur, while upward
counterfactual thinking occurs towards negative events
(Markman, Gavanski, Sherman & McMullen, 1993; Na,
2007; Roese & Olson, 1995).
The effect of counterfactual thinking on behavior can be
explained by psychological mechanisms, such as causal
relationships and contrast effects (Roese, 1997). When a
negative event occurs, upward counterfactual thinking indi-
cates that an individual would think he or she could have
avoided the negative event, leading to a causal reasoning.
Subsequently, such causality potently imposes responsibili-
ties or punishments for the behavior from the past (Wells &
Gavanski, 1989). On the contrary, causal reasoning could
have a positive effect, as well. That is, upward counterfac-
tual thinking indicates that some conditions could have
brought about a better outcome, so it helps to prepare the
person for a similar event in the future (Nasco & Marsh,
1999; Roese, 1994).
Moreover, counterfactual thinking results in a contrast
where greater emphasis is attributed to an alternative event
that could have happened, rather than on the actual event that
has occurred (McMullen, 1997; Roese, 1997). Upward
counterfactual thinking (i.e., thinking about a better possible
event) can deceive the individual by suggesting an event that
has happened is more negative than in reality. This process
is called a contrast effect, and it is generally followed by
negative feelings, such as regret (Zeelenberg et al., 1998),
shame (Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski, 1994), guilt
(Mandel & Dahmi, 2005), and hopelessness (Davis,
Lehman, Wortman, Silver & Thomson, 1995).
Taken together, it is hypothesized that people who
believe they are lucky when gambling would engage in
further inadequate gambling behavior. The difference in the
belief in good luck depends on whether a person believes in
the existence of luck, and the extent to which the person
perceives the presence of luck in everyday life. People with
high levels of perception in luck may be overconﬁdent in
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believing that personal traits “affect” the results of gam-
bling, which in reality is caused by chance (Wohl & Enzle,
2002). As a result, an irrational belief in good luck leads a
gambler to engage in more dangerous gambling behaviors
and to have higher expectations for winning.
At the same time, upward counterfactual thinking leads
to causal reasoning in that it could also provide a chance for
correcting wrong causality. The contrast effects of upward
counterfactual thinking would perform such a correction for
those who have high levels of perception in luck due to high
levels of expectations for winning. That is, a person would
perceive an event more negatively when the individual
thinks that he or she could have won if he or she had been
luckier. This is a negative evaluation that would decrease
gambling behavior.
The present study examined the effects of belief in good
luck and upward counterfactual thinking on gambling. More
speciﬁcally, the goal of this study is to investigate the effects
that those two factors have on cognitive evaluations of
wagering and of the results of roulette games. This study
further speculates risk factors and buffering factors for
gambling problems.
METHOD
Participants
Three hundred and thirty-nine students at C University,
which is located in Seoul, were asked to ﬁll out a survey
to measure their Belief in Good Luck (BIGL) score. One
hundred samples in the top and bottom 15% of the measure-
ment were selected. Thirty-eight of these could not be
contacted again or refused to participate. Thus, 62 students
participated in this study. Five samples had scores higher
than 3, and these were classiﬁed into the problematic and
pathological gambling group, and another 5 did not follow
the instruments for counterfactual thinking, so they were
excluded. Therefore, a total of 52 participants were consid-
ered for the later analysis.
Twenty-ﬁve participants perceived luck to be an internal
characteristic (56% of which were female), and the mean of
their BIGL score was 56.52 (SD = 6.15). On the other hand,
27 people perceived luck to be something determined by
chance (70.4% of which were female), with a mean BIGL
score of 33.22 (SD = 4.28). Given that the mean ages of
those two groups were 21.72 (SD = 2.25) and 21.96 (SD =
2.01), respectively, and that themeans of theK-NODS scores
were 0.76 (SD = 0.78) and 0.48 (SD = 0.75), there was no
signiﬁcant difference between the groups in terms of age and
gambling activities. Table 1 displays the classiﬁcation of the
participants depending on the groups.
Measures
Belief in Good Luck. The Belief in Good Luck (BIGL)
Scale, developed by Darke and Freedman (1997b), was
adapted. Two other students in a graduate program in
clinical psychology compared the adaption to the research-
er’s adaptation. Then, a bilingual person generated ques-
tions for back translation. After those questionnaires were
sent out for supervision by Darke, the ﬁnal items were
reviewed by the researcher and a Doctoral student in clinical
psychology. This measure was based on a 6-point Likert
self-report scale, consisting of 12 items, with a higher score
representing a stronger belief in good luck. In the present
study, Cronbach’s α was .82.
K-NODS: Screen for gambling problems. The severity of
gambling was measured using K-NODS, which was
adapted by Kyo-Heon Kim (2003) from NORC DSM-IV
Screen for Gambling Problems (NODS), which was deﬁned
by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the
University of Chicago. This measure was designed to apply
the criteria of DSM-IV to pathological gambling through
interviews. In this study, L-type questions were used to
check whether gambling problems were present throughout
participants’ lives. There were a total of 17 items in this
measurement, with a 0 representing a non-gambler or a
group at low risk, 1 and 2 indicate a group at high risk, 3 and
4 were considered problem gamblers, and scores above 5
represent a pathological gambler. The number of partici-
pants who scored 1 or 2 was 23, and 5 participants with
scores higher than 3 were excluded from the ﬁnal analysis.
Cronbach’s α for K-NODS was .91 (Kim, 2003).
Roulette program using a computer. A roulette game on
a computer was used to measure gambling behaviors. The
right side of the screen indicated a scale of 1 to 12 on a
roulette wheel, whereas the left side showed a layout of
game money with the amount of the wager, betting type, etc.
The amount of the wager was 500 Korean Won, with 500
won as a minimum and 5,000 won as a maximum per game.
Once participants chose the amount of the bet, the betting
type, and the roulette number, the game started at a push of a
“start” button. At the “stop” button, the wheel slowly came
to a stop. The participants won when the wheel stopped and
the roulette number they had chosen matched up with the
number that the arrow on the upper side pointed at. The
winners received game money depending on the odds, while
losers lost their initial amount wagered. The types of betting
and the odds that participants could choose are shown in
Table 2.
Table 1. Classiﬁcation of the participants depending on the groups
Belief in Good Luck
Low High Total
Upward Counterfactual
Thinking
Yes 13 12 25
No 12 15 27
Total 25 27 52
Table 2. Types of betting and odds
Types of Begging Number of Cases Odds
Single Number
Bet
12 7
Two Number Bet 6 (1–2/3–4/5–6/7–8/9–10/11–12) 5
Four Number Bet 3 (1–4/5–8/9–12) 2
Even/Odd
Number Bet
2 1
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The roulette game was divided into two sessions, and
each session consisted of 25 games. The two sessions were
designed to have predetermined outcomes, so Session 1 was
set up with 7 wins, while Session 2 had 2 wins (at the 2nd
and 16th turns). 80,000 won of game money was given
during each session. When all of the money that had been
initially given was used up, the participants were fore-
warned through a pop-up window that their money would
continue to be deducted according to their next outcome.
Session 1 was designed to induce upward counterfactual
thinking, and the processes for such manipulation reﬂected
a revised version of the method described by Petrocelli
and Crysel (2009). For the condition that manipulated
upward counterfactual thinking, whenever participants lost,
they were given a pop-up instrument written as follows:
“Please think about an action that could have led to a
win,” and write it down as one sentence. (There was also
an example of a sentence, such as “If I had : : : ., I would
have : : : ”) This study was designed to keep the game going
only after the participants had typed a sentence. Either for
the condition where the participants won or the condition
without the manipulation of upward counterfactual think-
ing, participants were given an instrument saying “Please
write down the ﬁrst thought that came to your mind in a
sentence.”
Session 2 was intended for measurement, so there were
25 games without the manipulation of upward counterfac-
tual thinking. At the end of each session, the pop-up of game
money was indicated, and the total of those amounts
determined the ranks for each participant.
Average betting amount & expected winning rates. The
average betting amount was calculated after all of the
amounts were collected at the end of Session 2. The ex-
pected winning rates were determined during a post-game
interview, “If you were to play another set of 10 games, how
many games do you think you would win?”
Procedures
First of all, after measuring the BIGL, the top and bottom
15% were randomly assigned into one of two groups, one
was induced in terms of counterfactual thinking and the
other was not.
To generate accurate gambling conditions, the partici-
pants were informed that they would receive a participation
fee depending on the results of the roulette games. After
ﬁlling out a consent form, the participants were asked to
read different instructions depending on their condition.
Before getting started, the participants were asked to
practice twice with the researcher to check if they
thoroughly understood the process. When the games were
ﬁnished, the participants were given questionnaires to assess
the expected winning rates and to debrief. Those who were
classiﬁed as problem and pathological gamblers were ex-
cluded from the data analysis. As informed, all of the
participants were paid depending on the ranks of the games.
Analysis
A frequency analysis and a descriptive statistics analysis
were conducted in order to investigate the division of the
groups and their demographic characteristics. An internal
consistency of the measure of belief in good luck was
veriﬁed using Cronbach’s α.
A 2 × 2 ANOVA [the level of belief in good luck (high,
low) x a tendency for upward counterfactual thinking (Yes,
No)] was conducted to examine the differences between the
average betting amount and the expected winning rates,
depending on the belief in good luck and the experience of
upward counterfactual thinking.
Ethics
All participants were informed about the study, and all
provided informed consent. The Institutional Review Board
of the Chung-Ang University approved the study.
RESULTS
The gambling behaviors that depend on the level of belief in
good luck and on upward counterfactual thinking were
pictured in Table 3. Table 4 and 5 represent the effects of
upward counterfactual thinking on the gambling behavior
among people who perceived luck to be an internal factor
versus those who did not. With respect to the mean amount
of betting, there was a signiﬁcant main effect of belief in
good luck, F(1,48) = 8.91, p < .01, but neither the main
effect for upward counterfactual thinking, F(1,48) = 1.62,
n.s., nor the interaction between belief in good luck and
upward counterfactual thinking, F(1,48) = 0.46, n.s., were
signiﬁcant. The results showed that people who had higher
levels of perception of luck, and who thought for luck to be
an internal factor, tended to bet higher amounts of money
when gambling than those who did not.
Regarding the expected winning rates, there was no
signiﬁcant main effect for the degree of belief in good luck,
F(1,48) = 2.97, n.s., yet a signiﬁcant main effect for up-
ward counterfactual thinking was found, F(1,48) = 6.82,
p < .05. Therefore, people who experienced upward
Table 3. Gambling behaviors depending on the level of belief in good luck and upward counterfactual thinking
BIGL
High Low
Upward Counterfactual Thinking Yes Average Betting Amount (100 won) (SD) 32.92 (14.12) 17.58 (12.52)
Expected Winning Rates (%) (SD) 20.77 (8.62) 22.5 (9.65)
No Average Betting Amount (100 won) (SD) 35.42 (16.37) 25.75 (16.47)
Expected Winning Rates (%) (SD) 35 (13.14) 23.33 (9.76)
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counterfactual thinking expected to have fewer wins in
gambling than those who did not.
There was a signiﬁcant interaction between the belief in
good luck and upward counterfactual thinking, F(1,48) =
5.39, p < .05, as shown in Figure 1. The simple main
effects of the analysis for the interaction results revealed
that when belief in good luck was low, there was no
signiﬁcant difference depending on upward counterfactual
thinking, F(1,25) = 0.049, n.s., and when belief in good
luck was high, the group who experienced upward coun-
terfactual thinking had higher expected winning rates than
the group who did not, F(1,23) = 10.41, p = .004.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of
belief in good luck and of upward counterfactual thinking
on gambling behavior among college students. First, results
indicate that groups with high levels of belief in good luck
wager more money when gambling than groups with low
levels of belief in good luck. This suggests that perceiving
luck as an internal trait is a factor that leads to wager more
money when gambling. This conﬁrms the results of other
studies, where a higher belief in good luck led to increased
conﬁdence and risk-taking behaviors towards uncertain
situations (Darke & Freedman, 1997a); those thinking that
they were lucky tended to wager more money (Wohl,
Young & Hart, 2005).
There was no difference between the groups with and
without upward counterfactual thinking. This seems consis-
tent with results from other studies (Hayes, Brownstein,
Zettle, Rosenfarb & Korn, 1986; LeFrancois, Chase &
Joyce, 1988) that claim betting behavior is related to
cognitive factors, rather than to the results of gambling. In
other words, it can be said that belief in good luck may have
a relatively more powerful effect on betting behavior than
upward counterfactual thinking.
These results can be also explained by the fact that
upward counterfactual thinking took place in a manner
which minimized regrets after gambling behavior, not in
a way that maximized beneﬁts after weighing the gains and
losses (McConnell et al., 2000; Simonson, 1992). That is,
the individual does not engage in causal reasoning because
he or she does not want to regret what could have been won
if less money had been bet, and the individual had not
lowered the betting amount. Walker (1992) coined the term,
“the state being caught in a trap,” to explain a phenomenon
that results from a similar psychological mechanism as those
discussed above, e.g., when people keep buying the same
combinations of lotto numbers once they have bought a
certain combination.
In addition to individuals not wanting to feel regretful,
the chasing behavior could have affected the results of this
study. Chasing refers to the behavior where after repeated
losses, people tend to increase the amounts bet in order to
make up for those losses (Dickerson, 1993). This chasing is
a well-known factor that results in several negative gam-
bling problems (Lesieur, 1984).
Table 4. Comparisons of average betting amount on the level of belief in good luck and upward counterfactual thinking
Source of Variance Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Eta Squared
BIGL 2016.03 1 2016.3 8.91** .157
Upward Counterfactual Thinking 366.05 1 366.05 1.62 .033
BIGL × Upward Counterfactual Thinking 103.61 1 103.61 .46 .009
Error 10862.95 48 226.31
Total 13215.71 51
*p < .05, **p < .01
Table 5. Comparisons of expected winning rates on the level of belief in good luck and upward counterfactual thinking
Source of Variance Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Eta Squared
BIGL 318.2 1 318.2 2.97 .058
Upward Counterfactual Thinking 731.42 1 731.42 6.82* .124
BIGL × Upward Counterfactual Thinking 578.53 1 578.53 5.39* .101
Error 5150.64 48 107.3
Total 6698.08 51
*p < .05, **p < .01
Figure 1. Interaction between the belief in good luck and Upward
Counterfactual Thinking, as correlated with expected winning rates
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The second result of this study is related to the expected
winning rates, and it indicates that groups with upward
counterfactual thinking expect fewer wins than those with-
out it. An interaction between the belief in good luck and
upward counterfactual thinking was also found. This indi-
cates that there was no difference between the expected
winning rates in the groups with low levels of belief in good
luck, despite of the presence of upward counterfactual
thinking. However, among groups with high levels of belief
in good luck, those with upward counterfactual thinking had
a dramatic decrease in their expected winning rates.
During their participation, people with low levels of
belief in good luck thought luck was a coincidental, unstable
factor (Darke & Freedman, 1997b), and largely considered
the contingency in the results of gambling. As a result, when
given a question to predict the winning rate, assuming that
they would perform the same game, they made a realistic
judgment based on their experiences of gambling, regard-
less of the upward anticipated counterfactual thinking.
On the other hand, people with high levels of belief in
good luck thought their luck and behavior affected their
chances of gambling, led to a decrease in the expected
winning rates through upward counterfactual thinking. That
is, a contrast effect occurred in that the higher expectations of
winnings coming from luck magniﬁed the reality of the
failure, which in turn caused negative effects and evaluations.
There are many studies that examine the directions of
anticipated counterfactual thinking related to emotions
(Mandel, 2003; McMullen, 1997), but inconsistent results
have been found in follow-up studies. Believing that the
directions were not the only factor for which anticipated
counterfactual thinking affected emotions, Markman and
McMullen (2003) proposed a reﬂection and evaluation
model (REM).
According to this model, given that upward counterfac-
tual thinking occurs, if the content is reﬂective, it is accom-
panied with positive emotions, and negative emotions occur
when the content of upward counterfactual thinking is
evaluative. For instance, assuming that upward counterfac-
tual thinking occurs, an individual would think that, “If I
had studied harder, I would have received a better grade.” If
the individual reﬂectively accepts this thought, focusing on
the possibility that an A could have been obtained, he or she
would feel positive emotions. On the contrary, if the
individual feels that the thought is evaluative, paying close
attention to an evaluation toward the fact that an A was not
received, he or she could feel negative emotions. REM
illustrates that for a contrast effect to occur, it is crucial to
counter how to perceive the content of upward anticipated
counterfactual thinking.
The results of this study have implications in terms of
providing a precaution against gambling addiction. First, it
was suggested that perceiving luck as an internal trait could
affect gambling, which is one of the cognitive errors. When
it comes to prevention, correcting the cognitive errors of
gamblers is important. As a result, when targeting those with
high levels of belief in good luck, it is necessary to develop a
process to rectify cognitive errors of the results of gambling
and of overestimations towards winning.
Second, this study found that upward counterfactual
thinking may be a means of severing the link between
dangerous gambling behaviors, including chasing and un-
reasonable betting. Gambling requires immediate decision-
making, which increases risks due to impulse. Also, there
are few chances in gambling to make up for losses. With
causal reasoning, if people have repeatedly worked through
the operations that help them realize that gambling is not an
internal factor, such as that involving skills and efforts, the
risk of gambling addiction would decrease.
Some implications for future studies and limitations of
the current study should be mentioned. First, this study
focused only on assessing upwardly counterfactual think-
ing. Therefore, future studies assessing not only upwardly,
but also downwardly, are needed to build up better ﬁndings
of the effects of counterfactual thinking on gambling be-
havior. Second, it was about virtual money, and participants
were all non-problem gamblers. Thus, future studies should
also consider pathological gamblers to examine whether or
not belief in good luck is a risk factor leading to gambling
addiction. Third, the effects of upward counterfactual think-
ing on emotions, motivations, cognition, or on a perceived
sense of control were not measured. Future studies should
address those issues in order to investigate the effects of
other factors on gambling behavior along with upward
counterfactual thinking.
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